Private environmental governance and international relations: exploring the links by Falkner, Robert
  
Falkner, Robert 
Private environmental governance and 
international relations: exploring the links 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
Original citation: 
Falkner, Robert (2003) Private environmental governance and international relations: exploring 
the links. Global environmental politics, 3 (2). pp. 72-87. ISSN 1526-3800  
DOI: 10.1162/152638003322068227  
 
© 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/17689 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2012 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
72
Private Environmental Governance and International RelationsRobert Falkner
Private Environmental Governance
and International Relations:
Exploring the Links
•
Robert Falkner*
This article is concerned with private environmental governance at the global
level. It is widely acknowledged that private actors play an increasing role in
global environmental politics. Corporations lobby states during negotiations
on multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), featuring prominently in
the implementation of international accords. They also interact with each other,
as well as with states and other nonstate actors, to create institutional arrange-
ments that perform environmental governance functions. The rise of such pri-
vate forms of global governance raises a number of questions for the study of
global environmental politics: How does private governance interact with state-
centric governance? In what ways are the roles/capacities of states and nonstate
actors affected by private governance? Does the rise of private governance sig-
nify a shift in the ideological underpinnings of global environmental gover-
nance? This article explores these questions, seeking a better understanding of
the signiªcance of private environmental governance (PEG) for International
Relations.
Private Environmental Governance and Globalization
It is widely recognized that “governance without government”1 is a reality in
world politics. While this claim is relatively uncontroversial in the case of inter-
national regimes created by states, the role of private actors in international gov-
ernance has been subject to debate. Growing numbers of scholars argue for the
existence of “social choice mechanisms”2 ranging from decentralized and self-
regulatory to more centralized, hierarchical forms of governance. “Private gover-
nance” emerges at the global level where the interactions among private actors,
or between private actors on the one hand and civil society and state actors on
the other, give rise to institutional arrangements that structure and direct actors’
* The author thanks the editors of this special issue and two anonymous reviewers for helpful
comments.
1. Rosenau and Czempiel 1992.
2. Dryzek 1987.
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behavior in an issue-speciªc area. These structuring effects resemble the “pub-
lic” governing functions of states and intergovernmental institutions, and for
this reason the notion of governance, and indeed authority, has been applied to
private actors.3
Private governance needs to be distinguished from mere cooperation
between private actors. Cooperation requires the adjustment of individual be-
havior to achieve mutually beneªcial objectives,4 and between private actors is a
pervasive phenomenon in the global economy. It is mostly of an ad hoc nature
with a short lifetime. Governance, however, emerges out of a context of interac-
tion that is institutionalized and of a more permanent nature. In a system of
governance, individual actors do not constantly decide to be bound by the insti-
tutional norms based on a calculation of their interest, but adjust their behavior
out of recognition of the legitimacy of the governance system. Cooperation may
lead to governance, but more is required than the spontaneous convergence of
private actors’ interests via the coordinating function of markets.
Private governance has been documented in many global economic sec-
tors.5 It is also increasing in global environmental protection, at the level of in-
dividual ªrms, industries and cross-sectoral organizations. For example, the US
Chemical Manufacturers Association, together with its Canadian counterpart,
developed the so-called Responsible Care program in the 1980s to promote en-
vironmental and safety principles and codes of management practice within the
global chemical industry. Through the market clout of American MNCs such as
DuPont and Dow, Responsible Care has been exported to a number of develop-
ing countries, becoming an important benchmark for developing good practice
in the chemical industry.6 Likewise, the International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) created a global standard for environmental management
systems (EMS) that provides guidance in the development of environmental
management across many industrial sectors and allows individual companies to
seek certiªcation. This “ISO 14000 series” has been adopted globally by corpo-
rations and regulatory agencies and has become the dominant reference point
for developing national or industry-wide EMS.7
While interest in private governance has grown more recently, the active
involvement of private actors in global governance is not entirely new. Private
actors played a substantial role in ordering transnational economic relations in
the 19th century, but in the 20th century, with the expansion of the state’s regula-
tory role, ªrst domestically, subsequently in the international system, the provi-
sion of global governance came to be associated primarily with public authori-
ties. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the re-emergence of private governance is closely
related to late-20th century processes of economic globalization and the corre-
sponding restructuring of state functions.
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The literature on globalization has thus provided a major vantage point
for the study of private governance and authority. Authors such as Susan Strange
and DeAnne Julius,8 and the polemic depiction by anti-globalization campaign-
ers of a globalized economy out of control,9 suggest the process of globalization
is intimately linked with a transfer of power and authority from the public to
the private sector. What is missing in this perspective, however, is a better under-
standing of the more precise connections that exist between globalization and
the changing role of private actors.10 In reviewing the debate on PEG, this article
argues that, while the existing literature in International Relations (IR) rightly
emphasizes the growing importance of new types of actors in global environ-
mental governance (business actors and social movements) it overstates their
autonomy, and underplays the high degree of variation within each type of ac-
tor. The following discussion stresses the importance of the relationship of these
new actors to other actors and examines three particular claims arising in the
context of globalization studies. Each claim suggests that the rise of PEG
amounts to a transformational trend in global governance.
The ªrst claim concerns the relationship between globalization and the
perceived decline of the nation-state. In this view, private governance indicates a
long-term shift away from state-centric models of governance to new forms of
authority located in the global economy, with private actors emerging as the
new sovereigns. Susan Strange, for example, has argued that over the last two de-
cades “the powers of most states have declined still further, so that their author-
ity over the people and their activities inside their territorial boundaries has
weakened.” At the same time, “non-state authorities . . . have impinged more
and more on those people and their activities.”11 Authors working within this
perspective emphasize the process of deterritorialization of global governance
as a consequence of globalization and challenge the traditional dominance of
state-centric regime theory in the study of global environmental politics (see
Paterson, Humphreys and Pettiford, this volume).
A second, related, claim links the emergence of private governance with
transnationalism and growth in global civil society. The latter is seen to support
“activities that shape widespread behavior and inºuence the way public issues
are addressed.”12 Private governance is thus a direct result of pressure exerted by
activist groups on corporations. It has become an important instrument in the
political toolbox of global civil society in its efforts to promote environmental
sustainability. Both the “state in decline” school and the transnationalist ap-
proach contribute to the emergence of a “glocalization” perspective on global
governance (see Paterson, Humphreys and Pettiford, this volume), which sees
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the interaction between global environmental politics and globalization as giv-
ing rise to multi-level governance. Governance is no longer identiªed solely, or
even primarily, with the regime-building activities of states. Instead, multilevel
sites of governance emerge out of interactions within the states- system, global
civil society and the global economy.
A third, alternative, conceptualization of private governance is found in
critical political economy. Following a neo-Gramscian analysis, capitalist forces
are seen to be engaging in alliance building processes with a variety of state and
civil society actors in an effort to realign the ideological and material bases of
the dominant hegemonic order.13 The rise of private governance signiªes a new
phase in the ongoing process of re-structuring global hegemony, in which
global ªrms organize to establish environmental standards with a view to shift-
ing the ideological focus in global environmental politics in the direction of
market-oriented, deregulatory systems of governance. The emergence of corpo-
rate-sponsored environmental regimes thus points to an ideological shift in or-
ganizing international responses to the ecological crisis, that ultimately helps to
cement the grip by the dominant class over anti-systemic forces.
These three perspectives raise important questions about the signiªcance
of PEG for understanding international order and change, suggesting a pro-
found change in the way it is organized. This change affects the roles of states
and nonstate actors alike, causing a power shift from the former to the latter.
Furthermore, if private governance is indeed becoming more prevalent in global
environmental politics, then the possibility of a fundamental shift in the ideo-
logical underpinnings of international environmentalism needs to be consid-
ered. In the following, these perspectives are examined and the impact of private
forms of governance on the roles of states and nonstate actors, as well as the
ideological basis for global environmental action, are investigated. I argue that
while important changes in the international political economy can be noted,
the above perspectives overstate the transformational impact of PEG.
Supplanting, or Complementing, State Authority?
A key question in the study of PEG concerns the relationship between private
actors and states. It can be argued that the rise of private forms of governance is
intimately linked with a decline in state power and results from the failure of
the states-system adequately to govern the global commons. In this perspective,
the signiªcance of PEG lies in the support it lends to those arguing for the aban-
donment of the traditional state-centric model.
Conventional studies of international environmental politics have viewed
global governance as a function provided primarily by the states-system,
through processes of international negotiations and regime building. Environ-
mental scholars were among the ªrst to point to the eminent role that nonstate
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actors play in promoting global norms and pressuring states into action. But
private actors are usually conceptualized as lobbyists seeking to inºuence state-
centric processes of regime-building. In some cases, private actors have exerted a
considerable degree of inºuence over outcomes, either supporting or hindering
progress towards effective environmental governance, as witnessed in the cases
of ozone layer protection and climate change respectively.14 But despite the
growing recognition of the involvement of private actors, the conventional no-
tion of governance remains ªrmly embedded in a state-centric setting, insisting
that effective governance depends on state authority in establishing and imple-
menting international regimes.
Viewed against this background, the emergence of private governance
poses a challenge to established understandings of the relationship between
states and private actors. This argument is central, for example, to Rosenau’s no-
tion of a multi-centric world which is contrasted with the state-centric world of
international politics.15 Recent writings in the ªeld of private governance suggest
a whole range of institutional arrangements at the global level that fall into this
category of a multi-centric world. Hauºer, for example, has analyzed the emer-
gence of “private regimes” within the oligopolistic market structure of the
global insurance industry.16 Others have highlighted the international authority
acquired by telecommunications companies, accountancy ªrms, credit rating
agencies and so on.17
Arguments of this kind provide fertile ground for exploring the new reality
of global environmental governance. A problem, however, is that what might be
called the “pure” form of private governance (governance outside the realm of
the states-system) is of only limited empirical and conceptual relevance. For
most instances of PEG are of the kind that are better described as “mixed” re-
gimes, where “the boundary between public and private spheres is blurred.”18
Hybrid private-public governance emerges out of the interactions of private ac-
tors, either with the involvement of states or with the later adoption, or cod-
iªcation, by states and/or intergovernmental organizations. States are not the
driving force behind the creation of such governance systems, but lend them
strength through ofªcial recognition or incorporation into international law.
This mixed nature of PEG can be seen in the case of the ISO 14000 series.19
In the early 1990s, a cross-sectoral group of corporate and legal experts from
around the world began drafting this global environmental management sys-
tem (EMS), eventually adopted in 1995. Although the ISO 14000 has a mix of
private and public sector members, its drafting was dominated by business rep-
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resentatives and reºects the interests of large multinational corporations. ISO
14000 is intended to become the global standard that would allow multina-
tional ªrms to apply an EMS across their transnational operations to reduce
transaction costs.20
ISO 14000 standards have already proved to be a successful tool in per-
suading industries around the world to seek ISO certiªcation for their EMS.
However, they derive particular strength from the fact that states and interna-
tional organizations have recognized the ISO standards and lent them addi-
tional legitimacy. Several countries, particularly in East Asia and Europe, have
adopted ISO 14000 as their ofªcial standards; governments are expected to in-
corporate them into their procurement and international bodies such as the
WTO have recognized the voluntary ISO standards as international standards
under the WTO system and as being consistent with the Technical Barriers to
Trade Agreement.21
Thus, private regimes such as ISO standards gain in strength and legiti-
macy because they are adopted by states and international organizations. More
often than not, they are hybrid regimes created by transnational policy networks
consisting of industry representatives and regulatory ofªcials. They exist outside
the states-system only insofar as the international community has not set com-
parable standards. States do, however, exercise considerable inºuence over such
private forms of governance in that they tolerate, and even encourage, their cre-
ation and maintenance by the private sector. Simplistic dichotomies between
private and public regimes do not help in understanding the dynamics involved
in PEG.
The idea that PEG may supplant or undermine the governance function of
the states-system is also called into question by the fact that many private re-
gimes are beneªcial to states in leaving the burden of implementation in the
hands of the private sector. States may actually choose to let industry establish
systems of self-regulation where there is no overriding demand for public regu-
lation. In these cases, states are saved from the often complex task of negotiating
international standards and do not pay the costs of implementation and com-
pliance. Rather than suffering from a lack of state capacity, as much of the glob-
alization literature suggests, states can therefore be seen to be beneªting from
the more widespread use of private governance mechanisms.
Finally, claims about the “state in decline” are misleading in not distin-
guishing between different states and differential ways in which they are af-
fected by private sector governance. The power of ªrms clearly has a more con-
straining effect on the autonomy of the state in developing countries than in the
industrialized world. And in the case of PEG, a similar case can be made for
arguing that it is primarily developing countries that are left with little capacity
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to inºuence, or resist, the setting of international environmental standards by
private actors.
Analyzing the ISO 14000 series, Jennifer Clapp demonstrates how devel-
oping countries were systematically disadvantaged compared to their Northern
counterparts. First, standard setting agencies from the developing world were
under-represented in the drafting of the management standard and were
thus unable to push for a discussion of issues related to technology transfer and
a phase-in period for developing countries. Second, some developing countries,
particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, faced considerable difªculties in
accessing relevant information about new environmental standards.22
North-South inequality in the setting and implementation of private stan-
dards is ubiquitous. Developing country interests regularly ªnd themselves
marginalized. Maintaining a sufªcient level of involvement for state actors,
based on UN-style representation, will therefore be crucial for developing coun-
tries in their efforts to redress imbalances in international environmental
policy-making. This is not to say that problems of North-South inequality do
not plague the state-centric forums of environmental governance, but tradi-
tional forums of international policy-making provide Southern states at least
with formal equality in the representation of their interests. Furthermore, devel-
oping countries have managed to improve their bargaining position in more re-
cent MEA negotiations, for example in securing additional funding for comply-
ing with MEAs,23 and in pushing for regulatory standards that were initially
opposed by industrialized countries.24
This does not claim nothing has changed in the relationship between
ªrms and states; the rise in PEG undoubtedly enhances the position and legiti-
macy of corporations in GEP. Whether it reduces the power of states at the same
time, or signiªes an erosion in state capacity, is another question; it cannot be
answered in a simple and straightforward manner, but requires more careful
analysis of the changing conditions of “stateness” (the institutional centrality of
the state) in an era of globalization.25 It seems clear, however, that the simplistic
dichotomy between government and market, and between state-centric and
non-state-centric governance at global level, is not helpful in trying to under-
stand the changing dynamics of global environmental governance.
Empowering, or Usurping, Global Civil Society?
A second set of questions concerns the way in which private governance affects
the opportunities for civil society actors in shaping global governance. The focus
here is on the interaction between corporations and the environmental move-
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ment, particularly the latter’s attempts to change the corporate sector’s behavior
in favor of greater environmental sustainability. A central argument in the
transnationalist research agenda is that environmental NGOs play a crucial role
in creating global environmental awareness, spreading ecological values across
borders, and targeting private actors in their campaigning efforts. In the era of
globalization, which provides the “infrastructure” in the form of global com-
munication systems, for new forms of “world civic politics”26 private governance
thus emerges not in a political vacuum but in an increasingly politicized space
of transnational interaction.
Against the backdrop of this transnationalist conception of global politics,
the rise of private governance can be seen as strengthening the position of trans-
national activist groups in global environmental politics. In this view, impor-
tant connections exist between the self-regulating activities of corporations and
campaigns organized by environmental and consumer groups around the
world. The argument is that corporate self-regulation reºects not so much a
desire by corporations to govern themselves but a need to respond to public
pressure. The campaigning efforts of NGOs are an essential factor in the prolif-
eration of PEG; they push and shove corporations in the direction of environ-
mental sustainability. At the same time, private governance helps empower
global civil society in providing activist groups with political levers that exist
outside the states-system.27
There is indeed growing empirical evidence that NGOs play an important
role in the formation of PEG, contributing in two principal ways. First, NGOs
target individual ªrms that they accuse of environmentally damaging behavior,
with a view to changing that behavior and creating conditions in which other
ªrms are induced to comply with higher environmental standards. An example
of this kind of activity is Greenpeace’s campaign against the sinking of Shell’s
Brent Spar oil platform in the North Sea, which forced the company to abandon
its original plan for decommissioning and opt for the more costly alternative of
dismantling on land. The repercussions of this were felt well beyond the indi-
vidual case. Greenpeace succeeded in creating sufªcient public awareness of the
potential ecological risks of deep sea decommissioning that other ªrms have
had to adjust their own decommissioning plans and explore alternative op-
tions. By attacking a single ªrm, Greenpeace succeeded in establishing a quasi-
standard for decommissioning of oil platforms.28
Second, NGOs also target entire business sectors, seeking to engage them
in a process of establishing sector-speciªc environmental standards. In this case,
NGOs are both a stimulus for and a participant in PEG, and may also play a key
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role in monitoring compliance. An important example is the global regime to
protect forests that has emerged outside the conventional, state-centric realm of
environmental regulation. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was launched
in 1993 by the World Wide Fund for Nature in response to a lack of effective ac-
tion by the international community. It establishes criteria for sustainable forest
management, certifying companies complying with FSC standards.29
The growing involvement of civil society actors in private governance
signiªes an interesting point of departure in the study of global governance.
Some analysts contend that NGOs are empowered by their ability to target
global ªrms in transnational campaigns without having to rely on the estab-
lished channels of international policy-making.30 According to this view, envi-
ronmental activism directed at the corporate sector has opened up new political
space that exists outside the conªnes of the territorially-based states-system. En-
gaging with private governance mechanisms thus provides NGOs with an alter-
native form of global environmental activism that is potentially more effective
than lobbying states to establish international environmental regulation.
Targeting individual corporations or industry sectors and engaging with
ªrms in a process of global standard setting has become an important form of
environmental activism for many NGOs. Yet this trend raises important ques-
tions about the nature of the relationship between private actors and activist
groups. Some activists have voiced concern about the closeness of this relation-
ship fearing that NGOs are in danger of losing their original identity as civil
society actors with campaigns driven by ecological values.
Indeed, these concerns point to critical issues in the conceptualization of
the link between private governance and global civil society. First, where envi-
ronmental NGOs provide the impetus for the creation of private governance,
they often do so in an unsystematic, uneven manner, concentrating on those en-
vironmental issues that are more likely to support media-intensive public cam-
paigns, as is the case with Greenpeace. It is often large corporations operating at
the consumer end of the production chain that are most vulnerable to con-
sumer boycotts and campaigns that dent their reputation. Recent examples of
successful campaigns against such ªrms include the sporting goods manufac-
turer Nike and the oil company Shell. Given the selective and uneven focus of
NGO campaigns, it therefore falls upon public regulatory authorities to ensure
adequate global governance. World civic action alone cannot guarantee compre-
hensive coverage.31
Second, the growing willingness of environmental NGOs to engage in a
constructive dialogue with corporations and participate in efforts to establish
private governance mechanisms has created a new form of interdependence that
may limit the scope for independent civil society activism. One aspect of this
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new interdependence between the private sector and civil society is the growing
reliance on corporate funding by some environmental NGOs. Another aspect is
the concern that, by working with corporations to create global environmental
standards, NGOs are effectively lending legitimacy to these corporations and
their business operations. Rather than empowering NGOs, private governance
can thus be seen as taming civil society actors.
There is undoubtedly an important link between private governance and
global civil society that warrants a transnationalist perspective on the changing
conditions of global environmental politics. But to presume that the rise of pri-
vate governance works in one direction, empowering environmental activists
and enhancing the potential for more effective environmental governance,
would be misleading. The study of transnationalism needs to be grounded in a
political-economic perspective that critically examines the power relationship
between private actors and environmental NGOs.
Shift in Authority, Shift in Ideology?
The third, related, dimension of PEG is that it is held to signify a shift not only
in authority but also in ideology. In this view, the growing reliance on private
governance in global environmental management represents a privileging of a
business-friendly, market-oriented approach to environmental politics over a
more holistic and ecology-oriented understanding of the relationship between
human activity and environmental destruction. The “privatization” of global
environmental politics is regarded as a process that undermines established,
state-centric, models of democratic accountability in global governance and
promotes a deregulatory agenda serving to weaken the transformative power of
global environmentalism.32
Underlying the trend towards PEG is a change in attitude and strategy in
the corporate sector over the last twenty years.33 In the 1970s and early 1980s,
corporate responses to the environmental agenda were largely hostile and con-
sisted of little more than reluctant adaptation. While many companies continue
to react in similar fashion, the 1980s saw the emergence of new responses based
on proactive and systematic integration of environmental goals into corporate
strategy. Having failed to stem the tide of environmental regulation and facing
changing consumer attitudes, many corporations began to develop systematic
environmental management strategies. Drawing on managerial approaches as-
sociated with ecological modernization,34 corporate leaders embraced the no-
tion that corporate environmentalism can promote “win-win solutions” that
further business and environmental interests.35 A practical manifestation of this
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was corporations becoming more actively involved in the international political
process, seeking not simply to block environmental initiatives but to shape and
inºuence them.
Corporate efforts to shape the global environmental agenda were particu-
larly visible in the run-up to the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. Individual ªrms
and organizations such as the Business Council on Sustainable Development
(BCSD) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) lobbied delegates
and promoted the idea of a partnership between the private sector, environmen-
talists and international society in searching for environmental solutions.
Putting forward an interpretation of sustainable development that sought to
reconcile environmental and business concerns, BCSD and ICC in a sense pro-
vided a blueprint for a more market-oriented and self-regulatory model of
global environmental governance.36
The ideas informing business interpretations of sustainable development
center on the notion that markets, if left to their own devices, have the ability to
regulate themselves. Environmental governance emerges as a natural outcome
of the market process and only in extreme scenarios requires intervention by
states to impose regulatory regimes. Under normal circumstances, producers
will incorporate environmental concerns into their activities wherever consum-
ers value environmental sustainability, allowing for the price mechanism to
establish the optimal level of investment in environmental protection efforts.
These ideas have entered the praxis of PEG in a number of ways. The ISO
14000 series represents the most systematic effort to date to lay down principles
of environmental self-regulation. They are based on the notion that corpora-
tions can agree to a set of principles and guidelines that govern their environ-
mental management without needing external, state-sponsored, enforcement
mechanisms. In the area of climate change, where the international negotiation
process has been predicated on the need for setting emission reduction targets,
global ªrms have successfully lobbied governments to include more ºexible im-
plementation mechanisms involving emissions trading systems currently being
set up by business organizations.
Critics, however, argue that this business interpretation of sustainable
development and environmental governance puts at risk the environmental
movement’s achievement in establishing a political agenda for international en-
vironmental issues. By linking environmental policies with the self-regulatory
economic agenda, private actors are seen to promote a managerial perspective
on global environmental issues that precludes a more radical critique of the
world economy as a source of the ecological crisis. In this view, the emergence
of PEG represents a shift in the ideological underpinnings of environmental
politics towards a corporate conception of state-market relations.37
Criticisms of this kind certainly provoke many questions and provide a
useful corrective to the belief in the self-healing capacity of global markets. They
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give rise to an important research agenda that sees private actors as part of a
wider global framework of domination based on a mix of economic might and
ideological predominance. Neo-Gramscian approaches in IPE, for example, em-
ploy the notion of a global hegemonic order, comprising elites from MNCs,
state agencies, civil society and academia, which legitimizes a speciªc model of
global political-economic organization and marginalizes alternative political
ideologies. Private governance appears to ªt well into the neo-Gramscian argu-
ment that global hegemony is never a ªxed entity, but is constantly undergoing
a process of contestation and re-alignment of its central forces. In this view, the
growing relevance of private forms of environmental governance suggests a con-
vergence of global hegemonic forces towards a model of environmental gover-
nance that favors “market-enabling regimes” over “regulatory regimes.”38
Yet, the view that the rise of PEG represents an ideological shift in global
environmental politics raises two critical problems; it is in danger of overstating
the inºuence of business in setting the global agenda and understating the con-
tinuity of a fundamentally liberal consensus enshrined in the global environ-
mental agenda. With regard to the role of ªrms, it is fair to say that private actors
have certainly adopted a more proactive role in global environmental politics
and are powerful lobbyists in the international bargaining process. But corpo-
rate involvement continues to vary considerably, across different sectors and
types of business organizations, and is far from promoting an ideologically con-
sistent agenda. As the international politics of ozone, climate and biodiversity
demonstrate, business conºict over the objectives and design of global environ-
mental regulations continues to weaken the business case in environmental
politics.39 At the same time, corporations often pursue contradictory objectives
when seeking to inºuence global environmental governance. Global ªrms may
wish to achieve harmonization of environmental standards while national
ªrms continue to oppose them; and although favoring market-consistent regu-
lation in principle, many ªrms that have successfully adapted to command-and-
control regulations often ªnd it in their economic interest to preserve such tra-
ditional, state-centric, forms of governance.
Moreover, the notion that we are experiencing an ideological shift in envi-
ronmental politics tends to understate the continuity of a liberal orientation
in global environmental governance. The rise of private governance has un-
doubtedly strengthened the place of liberal ideas of self-regulation in environ-
mental politics, particularly since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. But to suggest
that this represents fundamental change in the ideological underpinnings of
global governance underestimates the extent to which the institutionalized
praxis of environmental protection has come to reºect liberal political and eco-
nomic ideas. As Bernstein has recently argued, the emergence of the “compro-
mise of liberal environmental ism”40 over the last thirty years is less the result of
corporate efforts than of a convergence of policy ideas among leading members
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of state-sponsored policy networks, such as the OECD. He argues that “industry
cannot be credited with formulating ideas around sustainable development or
with being overly signiªcant players in its institutionalisation.”41 It is therefore
more appropriate to view PEG as strengthening the existing dominance of a lib-
eral environmentalist philosophy in international politics, than as being a
causal factor in itself. If an ideological shift can be detected at all, then it is oc-
curring within the liberal paradigm of global environmentalism, away from the
free-market ideal towards that of markets governed by large ªrms. As economic
liberals point out,42 global standard-setting by large corporations is at risk of
distorting free markets and discriminating against weaker competitors, thus fa-
voring the interests of big business and undermining the classic liberal ideal of
fair play in economic competition.
Conclusion
Private governance has become a reality in global environmental politics that
few analysts deny. Its signiªcance for International Relations, however, remains
contested in contemporary debates about globalization and international order.
There are good reasons to suggest that the rise of private actors in environmen-
tal governance points to an ongoing erosion of state capacity, empowerment of
global civil society and shift in the ideological underpinnings of global environ-
mental governance.
However, closer analysis of the phenomenon of private governance reveals
the more complex connections that exist between the “privatization” of envi-
ronmental governance and shifts in the relationship between ªrms, states and
global civil society. The new agenda in global governance is deªned by an intri-
cate private-public nexus in which private and public authorities work hand-in-
hand to redeªne the parameters of global policy-making. Environmental activ-
ists’ groups assume a larger role in shaping global agendas and pressuring pri-
vate actors into action, but their involvement in private governance also serves
to alter their role and identity as nonstate actors. And PEG not only strengthens
the predominant liberal paradigm in the ideational structure contained in the
global environmental agenda, but promotes a model of global self-regulation
that beneªts the interests of powerful MNCs.
This raises a number of issues that ought to be central to future research
on PEG in international relations. First, if the ongoing spread of private gover-
nance mechanisms does not suggest a straightforward power shift away from
states and towards ªrms but a more complex interdependence between private
and public actors, then the public-private mix in environmental governance
needs to move center-stage in the study of international environmental politics.
Second, given the close involvement of NGOs in private governance, we need to
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look more carefully at the ways in which global civil society actors are co-opted
into self-regulatory efforts, and how this changes their role and inºuence in the
global environmental agenda. Third, if private governance tends to promote a
particular international liberal consensus in environmental governance that
strengthens the position of MNCs, then we need to pay closer attention to ongo-
ing processes of redeªning the legitimacy of public and private actors in global
environmental governance.
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